The Times this week revealed that US Lietenant-General Freakley had been critical of the British effort in Helmand Province in particular.  He had specifically criticised the tactics of sending small groups of soldiers to defend small outposts in far-flung places such as Sangin.  He appears to feel that there should have been more offensive action to stop the enemy building up.  We certainly know, from our work and pro bono Inquests, that certain military groups have sustained heavy casualties employing this tactic.

This revelation was linked to an earlier investigation by the Times which referred to the MOD as grossly under-estimating the threat from the Taliban and ignoring warnings that planned troop numbers were inadequate.

Events this week – President Obama’s address to the nation on Iraq gaining sovereignty, and Tony Blair’s “journey” – only serve to focus attention on Afghanistan.  President Karzai has indicated that NATO strategy there needs to be reassessed.  The casualties bring their own imperative.  A further 7 US troops died at the weekend and the bodies of 5 kidnapped aid workers were also recovered.

I do not know if General Freakley’s tactics would have proved to be superior, taking into account the IED threat on mobility, but we do not appear to be any nearer to a solution markedly improved security situation in Afghanistan.

Yesterday the Times reported that the first “Rookie” bomb squads will be deployed to Afghanistan to deal with the ever-present cruelly effective threat of IEDs. These soldiers are reportedly not fully trained as EOD operators and the report contains critical commentaries indicating that there are no “short cuts” in this most demanding area.

Of course Panorama has already reported that the MOD stopped training new recruits for 18 months in 2002 to cut costs and most of the bomb disposal operators, who have tragically lost their lives, are young men in my view, being in their late 20’s or early 30’s. But one of the pictures in the report gives away the wider problem. “A Royal Marine from 40 Commando searches for IEDs with a metal detector”. We know that the devices are becoming increasingly sophisticated with lower metal content. It is ordinary soldiers who have to search for and locate the devices before calling in the specialists.

The last Inquest I did into an IED death was that of a 19 year old soldier. Health & Safety gets a bad press every day of the week but you have to wonder what the risk assessment of this threat looked like prior to our commitment to deploy and whether it was the risk assessment or those deciding that we would take the risk that got it so wrong.

As a nation we did not have long to dwell on the death of the 300th soldier to die in Afghanistan as the death was quickly followed by others. Commentators rightly indicated that whilst the member has numerical significance, each death is equally valid.

Paul Harrington, a Consultant in our MOD Unit, represented the wife of Private Darren George at the Inquest into his death in Afghanistan in 2002. Private George was the first soldier to die.

We continue our commitment to representing the families of service personnel at Inquests. Sadly we are familiar with many of the names produced in the charts that accompanied the 300th death. I could not agree more that every loss of life brings its own unique sadness.

General McChrystal may have exhibited poor judgment in connection with the article in Rolling Stone but President Obama may be guilty of the same in accepting his resignation. The Times Leader column today certainly mourned his loss.

The situation in Afghanistan is fragile and measured by casualties and deaths, both military & Civilian, political expediency and the need to show who is the Commander-in-Chief comes much lower on my agenda.

In March 2010 General McChrystal paid tribute to the work of the SAS’s ‘A’ Squadron and his appreciation of Special Unit involvement is unsurprising, given his own background. The understanding of tactics and appreciation for NATO forces is as important as his leadership and desire to win “hearts and minds”. If General Petraeus had not been there to take over this would have been very bad news indeed.

I do not welcome the fact that the Armed Forces are never out of the newspapers these days.  The news is almost universally depressing.  The Times have recently featured in-depth articles on the campaign in Afghanistan indicating that the Strategic Defence and Security Review finally offers the MOD, the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development the chance to get in shape for the challenges of this century.

On Friday they featured Bobby Wright, whose son, Corporal Mark Wright, died on 6 September 2006 in a minefield in Kajaki and whose acts of gallantry saw him posthumously awarded the George Cross.  We acted at the Inquest in October 2008 and the article refers to the Coroner’s Inquiry condemning the range of deficiencies in equipment and the shortages of helicopters and winches.  The Coroner told those responsible that they should “hang their head in shame”.  What may have been an isolated incident on shortage of helicopters very soon proved more than that.  It is equally clear that having the equipment without having the trained personnel is no use either.

 We are proud to support the work of the Mark Wright Project which helps soldiers trying to return to civilian life after touring Iraq or Afghanistan.

 I have already had anxious clients, with legal claims under way, express concerns that pressures on the MOD budget will result in downward pressures on compensation claims.  I have no doubt that such pressures have and will continue to be exerted but the claims’ budget deals with costs and damages and failure to make reasonable settlements will only increase the costs bill.  As with all things military, cutting corners is not an option.

The news that Colonel Bob Seddon of the RLC has resigned over fears that bomb disposal training could be compromised amid pressure to produce more counter IED operatives will undoubtedly affect morale.  Even if you don’t subscribe to Michael Yon’s view that we are losing the war and take comfort from Dr Fox’s promise that Afghanistan is his first priority, the threat from IEDs is overwhelming.  The death of Staff Sergeant Olaf Schmid who died in November diffusing his 65^thbomb highlighted the bravery of the extraordinary person at Service Personnel who are called in once a suspect device is located.  But we must not forget the ordinary soldiers from so many different regiments who have to locate these devices with vallons and the like.  At the recent Inquest into the death of Sergeant Paul McAleese we learnt that clearance of the alleys of the Pharmacy Road was done by infantry soldiers; only when a device is located can they call out the ATO and IED team.  It was Private Young who was operating the Vallon that day who was the first to die.  He was aged 18.  When Major Follett radioed for specialist assistance to retrieve Private Young’s body which was locatedby a secondsuspect device he was informed of a waiting time of around 2 hours.  Little wonder that Sergeant McAleese took more immediate action, sacrificing his life.

The table of Soldiers lost in Afghanistan (see BBC website) shows just how many have been killed through explosions.  Sergeant McAleese’s Regiment, 2^ndBattalion Third Rifles lost three men in Sangin the month before his death.  However the Panorama programme screened 24 May indicated that the MOD had not forecast the IED threat. It is of course now being catered for with the training up of more IED operators. Given that it is still the ordinary soliders who have to locate these devices and given problems such as lack of helicopters to transport the IED operators, only time will tell whether we can combat this viscous threat which has also taken the lives of 2,500 of the civilian population.

The internet has many stories of Soldiers who have had to walk the Pharmacy Road with its constant threat of IEDs.  The death of Staff Sergeant Olaf Schmid and his subsequent award for bravery making safe bomb after bomb, once over an 11 hour period is well known.  The Prime Minister spoke of robots and equipment but the reality does not sound high tech at all to me.  Staff Sergeant Schmid died in an alleyway off the Pharmacy Road sacrificing his life to save his colleagues.

On 20^th August 2009 Private Young and Sergeant McAleese also died in an alleyway off the Pharmacy Road.  Private Young died first, Sergeant McAleese during the attempts to retrieve his body.  The Inquest into their deaths are being held on 14^th May in Trowbridge and should examine the question of training, equipment, alternative transport through helicopters given the current toll of casualties and the fact that 5 soldiers have been killed on 10^th July by two IEDs whilst operating from the same FOB.  Sergeant McAleese was the son of an SAS hero who stormed the Iranian Embassy in 1980.  Sergeant McAleese and Private Young were also heros.  As I came into work today I heard on the news about Soldiers from 3 Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment being reunited with their families.  Private Young was from that Regiment.  Let us also remember those who are not returning.

The Times on 6 April 2010 carried the story of Private Dave Tatlock who carried the Carling Cup onto the pitch at Wembley before the game between Manchester United and Aston Villa in February.

The Times reported that the insurance company Abacus is reviewing the payout Private Tatlock was due to receive.

Kevan Jones, the Veteran Minister, is reported as saying this is an “absolute disgrace”.

I met Private Tatlock, who is a local lad, at Headley Court Rehabilitation Centre. Like all the soldiers I see there it seemed clear to me that he has suffered serious injuries and like many soldiers there he was working hard at rehabilitation and inspired with his positive mental attitude.

I certainly know that a lot of soldiers are unhappy with the outcome of their claims against several insurance companies who specialise in policies for the Armed Forces in terms of payouts they receive when injured in Iraq and Afghanistan. I do seem to recall that there was a shortage of insurance companies who were offering terms.

One soldier, who was insured with a different insurance company, expressed unhappiness to me that his multiple injuries could not be considered under the policy when as an EOD operator it was reasonably foreseeable that multiple injuries would occur.

I hope the Ministry of Defence has reviewed and is happy with the insurance policies available to service personnel before they deploy. I hope in this case that Private Tatlock is treated fairly by the insurance company on the basis of medical evidence that takes into account injuries he has sustained.

I have acted for members of a Specialist Unit for 20 years.  My clients do not write books and I have never read any of this genre myself. My clients do not appear in newspapers apart from one isolated report which was so unflattering to my clients case that it was obvious that he was not the source of the information.

I was therefore quite curious to read this book. It recounts the exploits of the Unit in what it calls “a secret war in Iraq”.  It was interesting to read in juxtaposition with the Chilcott Inquiry.  It was also interesting for me, advising in military aviation, to read about matters on the ground of which I have no knowledge. 

 It is clear from the Preface that the Author had some legal skirmishes prior to publication. I am not at all surprised.  My overwhelming initial feeling is not – how did this come to be published? But how did the Author have access to all this information?

 My clients have life long duties of confidentiality. An Investigative Journalist self-evidently does not.  These are clever people that they are dealing with and I can only think about they think it’s a good idea for this information to be in the public domain. Whether the families that I represent whose loved ones appear in the book share this feeling I rather doubt.

Colonel Stuart Tootal who was Commander of 3^rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment wrote in the Times last week that the success in Afghanistan and other similar areas of conflict requires “boots on the ground”; enough soldiers to take the territory and hold it and work with the local people. He supports the view of General Sir David Richards, the Chief of General Staff, that soldiers are ultimately more important than advanced technological aids.  It must be right that without the necessary manpower the equipment, no matter how advanced, will ultimately fail. That manpower needs to be trained and experienced.  The Puma review by Air Vice-Marshall Carl Dixon of May 2008 highlighted the problems that emerge when resources are stretched. Pumas were left in Iraq when the Chinooks deployed to Afghanistan and the Puma Force found themselves being called upon for many more years than had originally been anticipated. Problems emerged,  not from the lack of aircraft, but from the lack of experienced flying personnel.  We see it all the time in our cases in the ages of the victims and the deceased. The operational pressures that were put on some of the flying Puma Force are not easily understood by those of us who have never flown the aircraft here let alone engaging the enemy in complex manoeuvres at night on NVG with high threat levels and dynamic, ever changing intelligence and mission. It would be wrong of us to ask Service Personnel to take on these pressures too frequently, too early and too often.